一、課程簡介:

二、先修課程:

三、參考書目:

Department of Political Science
National Taiwan University

Seminar in Organizational Economics


Meeting time: W 15:30-17:20
Instructor: Risharng Chiang (Research Tower 215)
email: rchiang@ntu.edu.tw


Course Description

This course provides an advanced introduction to economic modeling of strategic behavior in organization. When individuals or corporations have market power that derives from size or superior information, the competitive model for determining market equilibrium is likely to be of little value. When economic agents have room for strategic behavior, institutions matter in the sense that organizational structures not only determine equilibrium outcomes, but even small changes in institutional structures can lead to changes in economic outcomes (and welfare of market participants) that are large.

Therefore, with strategic behavior, it is often important to model precisely the economic environment one is investigating. Without doing so, it is hard to tell whether a particular result is robust to small changes in the environment. This course will help develop modeling skills that can be used to develop intuition about situations involving strategic behavior.

Recommended Course Materials

Microeconomic Theory (1995) by Andreu Mas-Collel, Michael Whinston, and Jerry Green

Another useful reference is:

A Course in Microeconomic Theory (1990) by David M. Kreps

More advanced students will find the following texts useful:

The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2002) by Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort
The Economics of Uncertainty and Information (1990) by J.J. Laffont
Game Theory by Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole

Evaluation

Much of the material is best learned by doing problem sets. Many of the equilibrium concepts in the game theory section will seem similar, and the distinctions are best made by working through problems. There will be approximately six to eight problem sets. I suggest that you at firs